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After  rising  by  more  than  13  percent  in  1979,  the 
growth  rate  of  the  Consumer  Price  Index  has  further 
increased  in  the  first  months  of  1980.  Consequently, 
attention  is being  directed  toward  proposals  for  wage- 
price  restraint.  Among  the  proposals  that  have  been 
mentioned  are  a  wage  and  price  freeze  (as  in  August 
1971),  a  mandatory  control  program  (similar  to 
Phase  II  of  the  Nixon-era  controls),  or  some  system 
of  tax  incentives  and  penalties  designed  to  slow  wage 
and  price  increases.  The  latter  system  is  often  re- 
ferred  to  as  a  Tax-Based  Incomes  Policy,  or  TIP. 
The  Argument  for  Restraint  Whatever  the  exact 
form,  wage-price  restraint  has  well-known  draw- 
backs:  (1)  it  may  not  be  effective,  and  (2)  if  effec- 
tive,  it  can  do  severe  damage  to  the  economy  (see, 
for  example,  [10]).  Advocates  of  controls,  however, 
argue  that  the  costs  of controls  are  outweighed  by  the 
costs  of  the  alternative  anti-inflation  policy,  that  of 
totally  relying  on  monetary  and  fiscal  restraint. 
Arthur  Schlesinger,  for  example,  recently  argued, 
[T]he  prospect  of  depression  is  the  economic  re- 
ality  behind  Carter’s  anti-inflation  program...  In 
the long  run,  recession  will  indeed  slow  the  rate  of 
inflation.  But  at  what  social  and  human  cost?  . . . 
[T]he  worst  recession  in  nearly  40  years,  wide- 
spread  unemployment  and  considerable  human  an- 
guish  . .  .  is  .  .  .  peanuts  compared  to  what  would 
be required  to bring  down  the  20+%  inflation  rate 
Mr.  Carter  is  giving  us.  .  .  .  ‘The  reserve  army 
of  the  unemployed  will  eventually  squeeze  inflation 
out  of  the  system,’  the  economist  Francis  Bator 
has  aptly  commented  ‘  if  it  doesn’t  trigger  a 
social  revolution  first.’  The  Carter-Volker  policy 
.  . . is  one  of  enormously  high  risk  to  the  stability 
of  our  political  as  well  as  of  our  economic  system. 
It  offers  a  future  of  bitter  unemployment,  accom- 
panied  by  a  very  gradual  reduction  of  inflation 
and  by  very  dangerous  intensification  of  social 
tension  and  class  hostility.  [9] 
Evidence  that  monetary  and  fiscal  restraint  would 
produce  a  severe,  prolonged  recession  is  provided  by 
econometric  simulations.  After  evaluating  simula- 
tions  from  six  econometric  models,  Arthur  Okun 
recently  found,  “.  .  .  [T]he  average  estimate  of  the 
cost  of  a  1 point  reduction  in  the  basic  inflation  rate 
is  10  percent  of  a  year’s  GNP.  .  .  .”  [7]  If  true, 
Okun’s  conclusion  would  mean  that  lowering  the 
annual  growth  rate  of  the  Consumer  Price  Index 
below  3  percent  could  be  accomplished  by  a  mone- 
tary  policy  restrictive  enough  to  cause  a  10  percent 
GNP  gap  for  a  decade.  [The  GNP  gap  is  an  esti- 
mate  of  the  extent  to  which  real  GNP  is  below 
normal,  as  would  occur  in  a  recession.  In  the  first 
quarter  of  1975,  the  trough  of  a  particularly  severe 
recession,  the  GNP  gap  was  about  9  percent.]  That 
policy  would  reduce  output  by  about  $250  billion 
annually  (that  is,  roughly  10  percent  of  current 
GNP),  or  by  $2.5  trillion  over  the  decade. 
The  Fallacy  in  That  Argument  Policy  evaluations 
using  econometric  models  such  as  those  examined  by 
Okun  necessarily  assume  that  what’s  past  is  prologue, 
in  that  it  is  assumed  people  will  respond  to  projected 
policy  decisions  in  exactly  the  same  manner  as  they 
have  in  the  past.  This  seemingly  innocuous  assump- 
tion  does  simplify  analysis.  However,  previous 
policy  evaluations  based  on  that  assumption  have 
often  led  to  false  conclusions. 
One  illustration  is  the  income  tax  surcharge  of 
1968  and  1969.  Policymakers  expected  the  sur- 
charge  to  lower  consumers’  disposable  income,  there- 
by  reducing  total  spending  for  goods  and  services 
and  thus  dampening  inflation.  The  Council  of  Eco- 
nomic  Advisers,  for  example,  on  the  basis  of  the 
surcharge  predicted  a  reduction  in  the  inflation  rate 
for  1969  to  “a  little  more  than  3  percent.”  [3] 
Actually,  the  GNP  implicit  price  deflator  rose  by 
5.3  percent  in  1969  as  consumer  spending  accelerated, 
growing  at  a  4.6  percent  rate  in  1967  and  an  8.7 
percent  rate  in  1968  and  1969.  As  Robert  Eisner 
has  noted  141,  an  important  reason  that,  consumer 
spending  failed  to  weaken  as  many  had  predicted  was 
the  erroneous  assumption  that  consumers  would  re- 
spond  to  a  temporary  tax  surcharge  in  the  same 
manner  as  they  had  earlier  responded  to  permanent 
tax  changes.  In  this  case  the  past  was  not  prologue; 
therefore  the  actual  consumer  reaction  to  the  sur- 
charge  was  misjudged. 
When  an  econometric  model  fails  to  predict  the 
effects  of  an  economic  policy  correctly,  many  an 
economist’s  impulse  is  to  tinker  with  the  model- 
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new  equation  there,  to  experiment  with  a  new  sta- 
tistical  technique,  etc.  Robert  Lucas  [6]  took  an- 
other  course,  however,  by  systematically  analyzing 
the  foundation  for  evaluating  potential  economic 
policies  with  econometric  models.  To  understand 
Lucas’s  work,  it  will  first  be  necessary  to  review  the 
nature  of  econometric  models. 
An  immense  volume  of  statistics  concerning  the 
economy  are  regularly  gathered.  The  role  of  eco- 
nomic  theory  is  to  suggest  a  limited  number  of  po- 
tentially  useful  relationships  among  the  many  rela- 
tions  possible,  Typically,  one  first  specifies  the  eco- 
nomic  choices  available  to  individuals.  The  next 
step  is  to  characterize  the  choices  that  best  achieve 
certain  goals. 
Consider  the  problem  of  how  a  household  can  best 
allocate  consumption  expenditure  over  its  members’ 
lifetimes,  for  example.  Since  income  can  limit  con- 
sumer  spending,  economic  theory  might  suggest  to 
the  model  builder  that  consumption  should  be  related 
to  income  available  for  people  to  spend.  This  rela- 
tionship  could  be  expressed  symbolically  as 
(1)  C  =  q (Y-T) 
where  C  is  national  consumption  expenditure,  Y  is 
national  income,  T  is  the  level  of  taxes  and  q  is  a 
parameter,  that  is,  some  number.  Theory  might 
further  predict  that  q is  less  than  1,  since  individuals 
would  desire  to  have  funds  available  for  emergencies 
or  retirement  and  would  thus  not  consume  every 
penny  of  available  income.  Therefore,  equation  (1) 
states  that  national  consumption  is  a  fraction  of 
national  income,  net  of  taxes.  Unfortunately,  theory 
does  not  often  provide  the  exact  value  for  a  param- 
eter.  To  meet  that  difficulty,  an  econometrician  esti- 
mates  the  parameter  q  by  statistical  methods  using 
past  data. 
After  an  estimate  of q  has  been  made,  equation  (1) 
could  be  used  to  predict  the  effect  of a tax  cut  on  con- 
sumption  spending.  As  is  often  done  in  elementary 
textbooks,  equation  (1)  could  also  provide  a  basis 
for  a  relation  between  national  income  and  taxes, 
such  as 
(2)  D  Y  =  - 
q 
D  T.  1 - q 
In  words,  an  increase  in  the  level  of  taxes,  D T, 
q 
causes  a  fall  in  national  income  by  the  amount 
1 - q 
times  the  tax  hike.  If  an  econometrician  estimated  q 
as  .9,  for  example,  equation  (2)  would  imply  that  a 
A  particularly  graphic  illustration  of  misleading 
policy  evaluation  can  be  constructed  by  applying 
Okun’s  10  percent  GNP  gap  rule  to  Germany  in 
August  1922  through  October  1923.  Since  the  annual 
inflation  rate  was  300,000  percent,  Okun’s  rule 
would  imply  that  eliminating  inflation  in  Germany 
would  have  taken  a  50  percent  GNP  gap  for  600 
centuries!  Actually,  the  German  inflation  was  vir- 
tually  eliminated  in  1924  with  a  10 percent  GNP  gap. 
In  this  example  the  error  of  making  an  unwarranted 
extrapolation  is  clear.  It  will  be  argued  below  that 
1 Econometric  models  have  many  uses  in  addition  to 
policy  evaluation,  and  this  critique  does  not  challenge 
their efficacy  for  such  uses.  Moreover,  it  does  not  deny 
that  changes  can be  imagined  that  would  allow  valid 
policy  evaluation  (for  example,  see  [2]).  Such  changes 
are  not  trivial  and  have  not  been  made  on  widely  used 
models,  however,  including  the  models  examined  by 
Okun. 
2 Lucas  and  other  members  of  the  New  Classical  school 
of  economic  thought  (such  as  Robert  Barro  and  Thomas 
Sargent)  have  criticized  Keynesian  macro-econometric 
models  on  several  grounds.  It  is  useful  to  focus  only  on 
the  critique  of  econometric  policy  evaluation  since  many 
writings  by  leading  Keynesian  economists  follow  the 
same  logic.  As  noted  above,  Eisner’s  writing  on  the 
1968-69  tax  surcharge  is  consistent  with  the  Lucas  cri- 
tique.  Also,  Alan  Blinder  and  Robert  Solow  [1]  briefly 
made  an  analogous  argument,  that  “treating  the  fiscal 
and  monetary  tools  .  .  .  as  exogenous  in  the  statistical 
sense  .  .  .  involves  a  specification  error  that  all  econo- 
metric  models  will  continue  to  commit  until  they  specify 
and  estimate  a  proper  reaction  function  for  the  authori- 
ties.” 
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$10  billion  tax  increase  would  reduce  national  income 
by  $90  billion.  It  is  this  type  of  exercise  that  is 
labeled  “econometric  policy  evaluation.”  Although 
hundreds  of  equations  and  advanced  statistical  tech- 
niques  may  be  used,  the  process  of  econometric 
policy  evaluation  is  a  mechanical  extrapolation,  just 
as  indicated  by  this  example. 
Lucas  argued  that  this  policy  evaluation  technique 
is  not  logically  consistent.l  That  is,  the  same  eco- 
nomic  theory  that  is  used  to  suggest  equations  such 
as  (1)  also  predicts  that  a  parameter  such  as  q  will 
not  be  a  fixed  number.  Instead,  when  economic 
policy  changes  it  will  often  be  in  an  individual’s  self- 
interest  to  change  his  economic  behavior,  which  in 
turn  may  change  a  parameter’s  value.  That  is 
exactly  what  happened  in  1968-69.  The  temporary 
tax  surcharge  induced  consumers  to  spend  a  tem- 
porarily  higher  fraction  of  their  incomes  (in  equa- 
tions  ( 1)  and  (2),  that  would  mean  that  q would  be 
larger).  Most  econometric  models  therefore  yielded 
incorrect  predictions  of  the  effect  of  the  surcharge 
since  parameters  had  been  estimated  from  individuals’ 
past  behavior.2 the  same  error  is  made  in  the  well-publicized  econo- 
metric  policy  evaluations  that  predict  excessive  costs 
if  monetary  restraint  is  used  to  lower  inflation. 
Such  forecasts  rely  on  an  equation  similar  to 
(3)  p  =  a p e  +  bE, 
where  p  is  the  actual  rate  of  inflation,  p  e  is  the 
extrapolated  rate  of  inflation,3  E  is  excess  capacity 
(usually  measured  either  as  above-normal  unem- 
ployment  or  below-normal  GNP),  and  a  and  b  are 
parameters  whose  exact  values  are  unknown.  This 
equation,  sometimes  called  an  aggregate  supply  func- 
tion,  a  price  equation,  or  a  Phillips  Curve,  states  that 
the  actual  rate  of  inflation  is  determined  by  the 
extrapolated  rate  of inflation  and  the  degree  of  excess 
capacity.4  In  this  framework  restrictive  monetary 
policy  can  lower  inflation  only  by  slowing  the  econ- 
omy  and  causing  excess  capacity.  By  statistically 
estimating  the  value  of  the  parameter  b  one  can  then 
guess  the  amount  of  excess  capacity  needed  to  lower 
the  inflation  rate  by  a  given  amount.  That  procedure 
is  the  basis  for  estimates  such  as  those  examined  by 
Okun. 
These  estimates  assume  that  the  parameter  b  is 
fixed.  That  assumption  is  questionable,  since  the 
estimates  are  based  on  data  from  the  post-Korean 
War  era-an  era  dominated  (in  fact  if  not  in  rhet- 
oric)  by  only  one  monetary  policy,  that  of  frequently 
shifting  targets  (Robert  Hetzel  [5]  discusses  this 
policy,  labeling  it  “leaning  against  the  wind”). 
Briefly,  the  shifting  target  strategy  involves  respond- 
ing  to  the  most  pressing  short-run  concern,  such  as 
interest  rates,  unemployment,  inflation,  the  foreign 
exchange  value  of  the  dollar,  etc.  The  most  pressing 
short-run  problem  today,  of  course,  will  not  neces- 
sarily  be  the  most  pressing  problem  tomorrow.  In 
such  an  environment,  it  is  not  surprising  that  indi- 
viduals  have  been  slow  to  change  their  price  or  wage- 
setting  strategies.  They  have  observed  that  monetary 
restraint  has  previously  been  temporary,  and  that 
sooner  or  later  the  focus  of  monetary  policy  changes. 
Such  anticipations  have  so  far  proved  correct.  Thus 
rather  low  estimates  of  the  parameter  b  are  not  sur- 
3 The  extrapolated  rate  of  inflation  is  often  labeled  as 
“the  expected  rate”  or  “the  underlying  rate.”  Since  these 
concepts  are  usually  implemented  as  extrapolations  of 
recent  activity,  the  indicated  expression  may  be  more 
accurate. 
4 It  may  not  be  easy  to  see  how  this  equation  results  from 
individual  decisions.  Phelps  [8]  contains  several  seminal 
essays  on  this  point. 
prising,  since  individuals  knew  that  if  excess  capacity 
should  appear,  the  Fed  would  soon  shift  from  fighting 
inflation  to  fighting  unemployment. 
If  lower  inflation  were  to  become  the  dominant 
goal  of  monetary  policy,  the  outlook  could  be  dra- 
matically  different.  Abandoning  the  policy  of  shift- 
ing  targets  would  change  the  context  in  which  indi- 
viduals  make  price  and  wage  decisions,  thereby  in- 
validating  previous  estimates  of  the  parameter  b  in 
equation  (3)  and,  consequently,  the  estimated  cost  of 
monetary  restraint.  A  difficulty  in  implementing 
such  a  fundamental  policy  change  would  lie  in  con- 
vincing  individuals  that  policy  has  in  fact  been 
changed.  Simple  announcement  will  not  suffice  since 
anti-inflation  rhetoric  has  accompanied  recent  in- 
creases  of  inflation. 
Two  steps  toward  making  future  announcements 
more  credible  have  recently  been  taken,  however. 
Section  108  of  the  Full  Employment  and  Balanced 
Growth  (Humphrey-Hawkins)  Act  requires  the  Fed- 
eral  Reserve  to  announce  annual  targets  for  growth 
of  monetary  aggregates  no  later  than  February  20  of 
each  year,  and  to  explain  any  deviation  which  later 
occurs.  This  bill  gives  the  Fed  the  opportunity  to 
announce  targets,  and  more  importantly,  the  oppor- 
tunity  to  establish  a track  record  of  meeting  its  stated 
targets.  Such  a  track  record  would  increase  the 
responsiveness  of  individuals  to  future  announce- 
ments.  The  second  step  was  taken  when  the  Fed’s 
operating  target  was  changed  from  an  interest  rate 
to  nonborrowed  bank  reserves.  Many  economists 
believe  that  this  change  gives  the  Fed  more  control 
over  the  money  supply,  should  such  control  be  de- 
sired. 
Conclusion  The  foundation  for  wage-price  re- 
straint  is  anchored  in  the  quicksand  of  econometric 
policy  evaluation.  Frighteningly  large  estimates  of 
the  costs  of  monetary  restraint  are  irrelevant  if  there 
is  a credible  replacement  for  the  old  policy  of  shifting 
targets.  Even  if  such  a  replacement  were  adopted, 
reducing  inflation  would  not  be  costless.  However,  a 
credible  anti-inflation  policy  would  lead  to  changes 
in  individuals’  wage  and  price  setting  strategies  which 
would  alter  the  economic  outcome  away  from  that 
predicted  by  models  with  parameters  based  on  dis- 
carded  strategies  of  individuals.  This  conclusion  sug- 
gests  two  key  questions  that  are  not  addressed  in  this 
paper  :  (1)  whether  lowering  the  inflation  rate 
should  be  the  principal  goal  of  monetary  policy,  and 
(2)  if  so,  what  further  steps  are  necessary  to  make 
policy  credible? 
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